René Descartes: The Mind-Body Distinction One of the deepest and most lasting legacies of Descartes’ philosophy is his thesis that mind and body are really distinct—a thesis now called “mind-body dualism.” He reaches this conclusion by arguing that the nature of the mind (that is, a thinking, non-extended thing) is completely different from that of the body (that is, an extended, non-thinking thing), and therefore it

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument and the Bell Inequalities See the PDF Version. Author Information László E. Szabó Email: [email protected] Eötvös University Hungary

Philosophy of Dreaming According to Owen Flanagan (2000), there are four major philosophical questions about dreaming: 1. How can I be sure I am not always dreaming? 2. Can I be immoral in dreams? 3. Are dreams conscious experiences that occur during sleep? 4. Does dreaming have an evolutionary function? These interrelated questions cover philosophical domains as diverse as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, scientific methodology, and

Associationism in the Philosophy of Mind Association dominated theorizing about the mind in the English-speaking world from the early eighteenth century through the mid-twentieth and remained an important concept into the twenty-first. This endurance across centuries and intellectual traditions means that it has manifested in many different ways in different views of mind. The basic idea, though, has been constant: Some psychological states come together

Wilfrid Sellars: Philosophy of Mind The twentieth century philosophy of mind of Wilfrid Sellars (1912 – 1989) retains much from the traditional, Cartesian perspective. It endorses a realm of inner, private episodes of which we may have direct knowledge. However, Sellars rejects Cartesian substance dualism and the thesis that mental states are fully knowable simply by introspection. As an alternative, Sellars conceives of mental states by

James Frederick Ferrier (1808—1864) James Frederick Ferrier was a mid-nineteenth-century Scottish metaphysician who developed the first post-Hegelian system of idealism in Britain. Unlike the British Idealists in the latter half of the nineteenth century, he was neither a Kantian nor a Hegelian. Instead, he largely develops his idealist metaphysics via his defense of Berkeley and through his rejection of Thomas Reid’s philosophy of common sense.