Bernard Mandeville (1670—1733) Bernard Mandeville is primarily remembered for his impact on discussions of morality and economic theory in the early eighteenth century. His most noteworthy and notorious work is The Fable of the Bees, which triggered immense public criticism at the time. He had a particular influence on philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, most notably Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Adam Smith.

Anaxarchus (c. 380—c. 320 B.C.E.) As a follower of Democritus, Anaxarchus developed the skeptical tendencies within Democritus’ thought. Although our information on him is extremely sketchy, he is a pivotal figure connecting the atomism of Democritus to the skepticism of Pyrrho, if ancient philosophical genealogies can be trusted. He allegedly abolished the criterion of truth by likening our experiences to those of dreamers and madmen.

Philosophy through Film This article introduces the main perspectives concerning philosophy through film. Film is understood not so much as an object of philosophical reflection but as a medium for engaging in philosophy. Contributions to the area have flourished since the beginning of the 21st century, along with debates over the extent to which film can really be understood to be “doing” philosophy, as opposed

Fondamentalisme Le fondationnalisme épistémique est une vision de la structure appropriée de ses connaissances ou de ses croyances justifiées.. Certaines croyances sont connues ou fondées à croire uniquement parce que d’autres croyances sont connues ou fondées à croire.. Par exemple, vous ne pouvez savoir que vous souffrez d'une maladie cardiaque que si vous connaissez d'autres allégations, telles que celles signalées par vos médecins et si les médecins sont fiables.. Le soutien que ces croyances apportent

James Frédéric Ferrier (1808-1864) James Frederick Ferrier was a mid-nineteenth-century Scottish metaphysician who developed the first post-Hegelian system of idealism in Britain. Unlike the British Idealists in the latter half of the nineteenth century, he was neither a Kantian nor a Hegelian. Plutôt, he largely develops his idealist metaphysics via his defense of Berkeley and through his rejection of Thomas Reid’s philosophy of common sense.