Collective Intentionality The idea that a collective could be bearer of intentional states such as belief and intention is likely to raise some eyebrows, especially in certain Anglo-American and European philosophical circles. The dominant picture in these circles is that intentionality is a feature of individual minds/brains. On the face of it, groups don’t have minds or brains. How could they have intentional states? Despite

Francis Bacon (1561—1626) Sir Francis Bacon (later Lord Verulam and the Viscount St. Albans) was an English lawyer, statesman, essayist, storico, intellectual reformer, philosopher, and champion of modern science. Early in his career he claimed “all knowledge as his province” and afterwards dedicated himself to a wholesale revaluation and re-structuring of traditional learning. To take the place of the established tradition (a miscellany of Scholasticism,

Kwasi Wiredu (1931— ) Kwasi Wiredu è un filosofo del Ghana, che da decenni è coinvolto in un progetto che definisce “decolonizzazione concettuale” nei sistemi di pensiero africani contemporanei. Per decolonizzazione concettuale, Wiredu sostiene un riesame delle attuali formazioni epistemiche africane al fine di raggiungere due obiettivi. Primo, desidera sovvertire gli aspetti sgradevoli della cultura tribale incorporati nel pensiero africano moderno in modo da farlo

Semantica Bidimensionale Bidimensionale (2D) le teorie semantiche distinguono tra due aspetti diversi, o "dimensioni", del significato delle espressioni linguistiche. Molte altre teorie identificano il significato di un'espressione con una dipendenza della sua estensione dallo stato del mondo. (L'estensione di una frase è il suo valore di verità, e l'estensione di un'espressione sub-sentenziale è l'oggetto o gli oggetti a cui si applica.) Considera il

Epistemology of Testimony We get a great number of our beliefs from what others tell us. The epistemology of testimony concerns how we should evaluate these beliefs. Here are the main questions. When are the beliefs justified, and why? When do they amount to knowledge, and why? When someone tells us p, where p is some statement, and we accept it, then we are forming

Transcendental Arguments Transcendental arguments are partly non-empirical, often anti-skeptical arguments focusing on necessary enabling conditions either of coherent experience or the possession or employment of some kind of knowledge or cognitive ability, where the opponent is not in a position to question the fact of this experience, conoscenza, or cognitive ability, and where the revealed preconditions include what the opponent questions. Such arguments take as