Charles Hartshorne: Dipolar Theism From the beginning to the end of his career Charles Hartshorne maintained that the idea that “God is love” was his guiding intuition in philosophy. This “intuition” presupposes both that there is a divine reality and that that reality answers to some positive description of being a loving God. This article focuses on the latter issue, nämlich, Hartshorne’s concept of God.

Jacqueline Pascal (1625—1661) A Cistercian nun, Jacqueline Pascal made a major contribution to philosophy of education through her treatise on the methods and principles of the pedagogy used at the convent school at Port-Royal. In her educational theory, the teacher emerges as a spiritual director who encourages the moral progress of her pupils through ascetical exercises and personal interviews. The right of women to acquire

Future Contingents The riddle of the future bewilders human beings. Einerseits, we are inclined to think that future events are real in some sense, because we ask questions and make assertions about them. Andererseits, we are inclined to think that future events may depend on our choices, because we conceive of ourselves as free agents. These two inclinations seem

Political Realism Political realism is a theory of political philosophy that attempts to explain, model, and prescribe political relations. It takes as its assumption that power is (or ought to be) the primary end of political action, whether in the domestic or international arena. In the domestic arena, the theory asserts that politicians do, or should, strive to maximize their power, whilst on the international

William Mitchell (1861–1962) Sir William Mitchell war der erste große Philosoph, der in Südaustralien lebte. Von 1895 bis 1940 arbeitete er an der Adelaide University hauptsächlich auf dem Gebiet der heutigen Kognitionswissenschaft. Sein Hauptwerk: Struktur und Wachstum des Geistes ist eine Abhandlung über philosophische Psychologie. Mitchell kam den Behauptungen von Nagel zuvor, McGinn, und Chalmers und ihre Betonung auf

Contrary-to-Duty Paradox A contrary-to-duty obligation is an obligation telling us what ought to be the case if something that is wrong is true. Zum Beispiel: ‘If you have done something bad, you should make amends’. Doing something bad is wrong, but if it is true that you did do something bad, it ought to be the case that you make amends. Here are some other