Das Lucas-Penrose-Argument über Gödels Theorem im Jahr 1961, J.R. Lucas veröffentlichte „Minds, Maschinen und Gödel,“, in dem er ein kontroverses Anti-Mechanismus-Argument formulierte. Das Argument behauptet, dass Gödels erster Unvollständigkeitssatz zeigt, dass der menschliche Geist keine Turing-Maschine ist, das ist, ein Computer. Das Argument hat seitdem viele Diskussionen ausgelöst. Die einflussreiche Computational Theory of Mind, die behauptet, dass die

David Hume: Causation David Hume (1711-1776) is one of the British Empiricists of the Early Modern period, along with John Locke and George Berkeley. Although the three advocate similar empirical standards for knowledge, das ist, that there are no innate ideas and that all knowledge comes from experience, Hume is known for applying this standard rigorously to causation and necessity. Instead of taking the notion

The Value of Art Philosophical discourse concerning the value of art is a discourse concerning what makes an artwork valuable qua its being an artwork. Whereas the concern of the critic is what makes the artwork a good artwork, the question for the aesthetician is why it is a good artwork. When we refer to a work’s value qua art, we mean those elements of

Mozi (Mo-tzu, c. 400s—300s B.C.E.) Mo Di (Mo Ti), better known as Mozi (Mo-tzu) or “Master Mo,” was a Chinese thinker active from the late 5th to the early 4th centuries B.C.E. He is best remembered for being the first major intellectual rival to Confucius and his followers. Mozi’s teaching is summed up in ten theses extensively argued for in the text that bears his

Objects of Perception The objects of perception are the entities we attend to when we perceive the world. Perception lies at the root of all our empirical knowledge. We may have acquired much of what we know about the world through testimony, but originally such knowledge relies on the world having been perceived by others or ourselves using our five senses: Sicht, Anhörung, touch, schmecken,

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Saul Kripke, in his celebrated book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), offers a novel reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s main remarks in his later works, especially in Philosophical Investigations (1953) und, bis zu einem gewissen Grad, in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956). Kripke presents Wittgenstein as proposing a skeptical argument against a certain conception of meaning and linguistic understanding, as well as